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This article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and post-
Chicago School arguments in assessing whether regulation should mandate open access to 
information platforms.  The authors outline three alternative models that the FCC could adopt to 
guide its regulation of information platforms in the future and facilitate a true convergence between 
antitrust and regulatory policy. 
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Some current issues in telecommunications policy follow a pattern familiar from many 
regulatory and antitrust problems.  A firm has considerable market power in one market or activity.  
In a closely complementary activity, there is competition, or it seems there could be.  But the 
powerful firm, not content to exploit its power where it lies, gets involved in the competitive activity.  
For over fifty years, antitrust and regulatory policy have offered varying answers as to whether 
“vertical leveraging” – through contract or integration through tie-in arrangement, product bundling, 
or merger – should concern public policymakers.  
In broad-brush terms, antitrust policy found vertical restraints or integration suspect until the 
1970s.  By the late 1970s, however, the Chicago School of antitrust economics had moved 
mainstream antitrust thinking to the position that such behavior had many efficiency benefits and was 
unlikely to cause competitive harm.
1  While post-Chicago School scholarship of the 1980s and 1990s 
has substantially weakened that view, we would loosely describe current antitrust doctrine as 
presuming that vertical agreements, vertical extension, and vertical mergers are unobjectionable 
unless a fact-intensive investigation shows otherwise.  
  By contrast, in similarly broad-brush terms, telecommunications policy positively encouraged 
integration and close coordination into “one network” until a series of FCC and court decisions during 
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the 1970s and 1980s.  Those decisions shifted policy into trying to develop and protect a system of 
open interfaces.  This favoring of “open architecture” reflected a philosophy that powerful firms at 
one level should not be allowed to leverage that power into—or, in some cases, even participate in—
adjacent competitive segments.  Likewise, the United States government’s early support for the 
Internet encouraged the development of an open architecture based on modular standards.
2 
  These contrasting traditions of analyzing vertical leverage leave telecommunications policy 
unsettled as technological convergence and emerging competition in telecommunications blur the 
lines between industries regulated primarily by antitrust and by telecommunications law (i.e., 
computing and telecommunications), and as telecommunications regulators increasingly pledge fealty 
to antitrust approaches.
3  The clash of traditions and of arguments is particularly sharp in one of 
today’s central telecommunications problems:  the regulatory treatment of broadband transport and its 
close complements.  Broadband transport, usually provided by cable modems or telephone digital 
subscriber lines (DSL), promises to transform the Internet by vastly speeding up downloads and by 
permitting high-bandwidth applications.
4  Some, most notably Lawrence Lessig, urge regulators to 
impose modularity on this market by requiring broadband Internet transport providers to provide 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 The landmark event for the rise of Chicago School thinking was the Supreme Court’s decision in Continental 
TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1978), which cited heavily to Chicago School criticisms of the 
Court’s earlier doctrine, see id. at 48 n.13, 55, 56.  
2 As we explain in more detail below, “modularity” is a means of managing complexity.  As one commentator 
defined the term, modularity involves the “breaking up [of] a complex system into discrete pieces—which can 
then communicate with one another only through standardized interfaces within a standardized architecture—
[in order to] eliminate what would otherwise be an unmanageable spaghetti tangle of systemic 
interconnections.”  Richard N. Langlois, Modularity In Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & 
ORG. 19, 19 (2002). 
3 For two discussions of the impact of convergence on regulatory policy, see Philip J. Weiser, The Imperative of  
Harmonization Between Antitrust and Regulation, 698 PLI/PAT 73 (2002); Philip J. Weiser, Law and 
Information Platforms, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. __ (2002).   
4 The definition of  “broadband” will evolve over time, but the FCC’s current dividing line is 200 kilobits per 
second, as it constitutes “enough capacity to provide the most popular forms of broadband—to change web 
pages as fast as one can flip through the pages of a book and to transmit full-motion video.”  Inquiry 
Concerning the Development of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonably 
Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Development Pursuant to Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd 2398, 2406 (1999); id. at 2407-08 (noting that definition will 
evolve); see also Inquiry Concerning the Development of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonably Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Development Pursuant to 
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 17 FCC Rcd. 2844, 2847 (2002) (adhering to definition);   3
“open access” to their facilities for Internet service providers.
5  Others, echoing the Chicago School 
perspective, argue that the market will facilitate open access to the extent that it is efficient. 
  The vertical leverage question is even more ubiquitous than may initially appear because 
policymakers and commentators often use different terms to describe these issues.
 6  Antitrust 
commentators discuss “the primary (or sometimes `bottleneck’) market” and “the secondary (or 
complementary) market.”  In telecommunications, participants talk of “conduits” and “content.”  This 
Article, consistent with the terminology often used in the computer industry, will distinguish between 
“platforms” (often “information platforms”) and “applications.”  More fundamentally, the essence of 
the issue stems from the “complementarity” that arises between “applications” and “platforms,” 
regardless of whether the application is an input to the platform, a buyer of the platform, or neither.
 7  
Over this past winter, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) 
announced a set of rulemaking proceedings aimed at defining its policy towards broadband 
connections to the Internet.
8  These proceedings ambitiously aim to develop a new regulatory 
framework for digital technologies that can provide multiple services – text, video, audio, voice, etc. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BROADBAND: BRINGING HOME THE BITS 78-80 (2002) (hereinafter, “BRINGING 
HOME THE BITS”) (proposing alternative definition). 
5 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS 147-67 (2001).  This argument builds off a prior piece with Mark 
Lemley that addressed critics of this proposal.  See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End- to-
End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001) (engaging 
arguments made in Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 COLO. L. REV. 819, 
831 (2000) and James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile? A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 77-90 (2000)). 
6 For a further explanation of the information platform concept and how it can frame technology policy debates, 
see Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH L. __, __-__ (2002).  A 
notable example of an information platform from the computer industry is the Microsoft Windows operating 
system, which exposes Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that can be used by application developers 
to “call” on certain functions provided by the operating system.  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 
34, 53 (2001). 
7 In part for this reason, we define “applications” broadly, not distinguishing between “software applications” 
and “hardware products” (such as peripherals), both of which may connect to an underlying platform.  Rather, 
we will use the term “applications” for all complementary products or services used in conjunction with a 
platform.   
8 See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concering High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory 
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) (Cable Modem Order); Wireline 
Broadband NPRM, supra note __.   4
– over broadband connections.
9  The FCC may thus develop a principled framework to evaluate 
independent providers’ claims for mandated access to a platform such as broadband transport.
10  Such 
a framework could also guide policy in related contexts, such as the appropriate unbundling policy for 
the local telecommunications network.
11  Thus, the stakes of the current debate over vertical leverage 
are high. 
This Article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and 
post-Chicago School arguments in assessing whether regulation should mandate open access to 
information platforms.  The central analytical tool—but not necessarily the victor—in our discussion 
is a Chicago School-style argument we call ICE (for reasons discussed below).  ICE claims that even 
a monopolist has incentives to provide access to its platform when it is efficient to do so, and to deny 
such access only when access is inefficient.  ICE is often a persuasive argument, yet its logic admits 
several cogent exceptions.  Unfortunately, both regulators and commentators often fail to 
acknowledge the complexity of this principle and seek easy answers, either ignoring ICE or failing to 
acknowledge its exceptions.  Only by acknowledging the interplay of ICE and its exceptions can 
regulators develop a sophisticated economics-based framework for analyzing open access 
requirements.
12   
  This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I recounts experiences of the Internet, computer, and 
telecommunications industries, illustrating the powerful benefits of modularity that inspire proponents 
of open access regulation.  To explain the Chicago School skepticism of such regulation, Part II first 
                                                           
9 BRINGING HOME THE BITS, supra note __, at 9 (“With convergence, everything—video, audio, text, and so 
forth—has become a digital stream that can be transported across the Internet.”). 
10  Such a framework would provide more guidance than past FCC decisions in this area, which have tended to 
arise in merger reviews and have been ad hoc in nature.  See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach To 
Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 255, 256 (2002) (“And yet, despite these controversies and many 
others, the only legal rules governing Internet interconnection are a limited number of company-specific 
conditions in imposed in some merger reviews.”); Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and 
Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822, 844 (2001) ("In terms of setting a precedent for future regulation of 
information platforms, the FCC's AOL/Time Warner Order failed to set forth a principled model of analysis.").  
11 See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. F.C.C., 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remanding development of standard for the 
unbundling of the local telecommunications network back to the FCC).     5
discusses how close vertical relationships and related (i.e., other than arm’s-length modular) strategies 
can yield important efficiencies.  Part II then explains the “ICE” principle:  even monopoly platform 
providers have at least some incentive to operate in a modular fashion when it is efficient to do so: 
they internalize the complementary efficiencies.  Part III describes some holes in the ICE logic: we 
give eight reasons why a monopoly platform provider might inefficiently “close” its platform.  We do 
not see a comparable array of reasons why such a monopoly might inefficiently open its platform.  
Part IV outlines the set of regulatory tools often used to facilitate open access, using the FCC’s 
Computer Inquiries to illustrate how the subtlety of these issues, if not carefully understood, can lead 
to policy instability.  In conclusion, the Article outlines three alternative models that the FCC could 
adopt to guide its regulation of information platforms in the future and facilitate a true convergence 
between antitrust and regulatory policy. 
 
I.  Open Architecture, Vertical Disintegration, and Modularity 
  This Part focuses on the benefits of modularity.  Sections A, B, and C explain how the 
Internet, computing, and telecommunications industries all came to be organized in more or less a 
modular fashion.  Section D then discusses the benefits of modularity in general, and the rationale for 
making it a guiding light for information policy. 
 
A.  The Creation of the Internet and Its End-to-End Architecture 
The Internet’s development was a triumph of United States technology policy.  The Internet 
grew from the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Administration’s ARPANET and later 
relied on support from the National Science Foundation.  From its early days in the late 1960s until 
the early 1990s, the Internet remained a government project, relying on the academic and research 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12 For a similar observation and a project related to ours, see Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and 
Media Regulation In The New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 177 n.19 & 178 (2002) (describing project’s 
focus on cable and broadcast markets, but disclaiming any application to telecommunications markets).   6
community for its development.
13  By the time commercial entities developed Internet services and 
products in the 1990s, its basic architecture was already shaped.  This architecture reflects a conscious 
strategy by the Internet pioneers that the platform should not anticipate what applications would rely 
on it, and that no central gatekeeper should decide which applications could be provided.   
The Internet can be understood as comprised of four layers.
14  At its center lies the logical 
layer,
15 essentially a two-part standard called the Transfer Control Protocol and Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) that enables computer-to-computer communication.  The Internet Protocol (IP) enables 
network devices (“routers”) to send packets of data to their destination without even knowing what 
form of data is being transmitted.
16  This design feature is often called “end-to-end” networking.
17 
The openness of the Internet’s technical architecture invites diversity in the layers above it 
and the physical layer beneath it.  The physical layer includes wired, wireless, satellite, and cable 
                                                           
13 See Abbate, supra note __, at 54-65.   
14 There is no standard way to describe the relevant layers of Internet architecture.  Lawrence Lessig, for 
example, suggests a definition of the content layer that includes what others call the application layer.  See 
Lawrence Lessig, The Internet Under Siege, FOREIGN POLICY 56, 59, 60 (November/December 2001); see also 
Yochai Benkler & Alan Toner, Access To The Internet 3 (June 12, 2001) (available at 
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/ilaw/Access/) (using three-layered model and defining logical and applications layer 
as one).   Tim Berners-Lee and Kevin Werbach, by contrast, set out a model similar to what we have in mind.  
See TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB __ (1999); Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model For Internet Policy, 1 
J. TELECOM & HIGH TECH. L.  __, __ (2002); see also Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. 
TELECOM & HIGH TECH. L.  __, __ (2002) (same). 
15 In light of this protocol’s central importance, many definitions of the term “Internet” emphasize the critical 
role of theTCP/IP standard.  See, e.g., FNC Resolution:  Definition of Internet (October 24, 1995) (available at 
http://www.itrd.gov/fnc/Internet_res.html).  The FCC has underscored this point, opting to use: 
 
the definition of the Internet that has been adopted by the Federal Networking Council: “‘Internet’ 
refers to the global information system that -- (i) is logically linked together by a globally unique 
address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to 
support communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or 
its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses or 
makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered on the communications and 
related infrastructure described herein.”   
 
In The Matter of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GN 
Docket 00-185, FCC 02-77 2 n.1 (March 15, 2002) (citing See FNC Resolution: Definition of ‘Internet,’ 
available at http://www.itrd.gov/fnc/ Internet_res.html, visited Jan. 22, 2002). 
16 For an explanation of this standard, see Robert E. Kahn & Vinton G. Cerf, Internet Policy Institute, What Is 
the Internet? (And What Makes It Work) (December 1999) (available at 
http://www.internetpolicy.org/briefing/12_99_ story.html); Abbate, supra note __, at 122-130; see also James 
B. Speta, Internet Interconnection, supra note __, 245-46.     7
transport facilities.  In the layers above, developers can create new applications such as email, World 
Wide Web, and Napster without first asking permission of a custodian of the TCP/IP standard.  In 
turn, these applications facilitate the exchange and viewing of multimedia content.  In explaining the 
development of the Internet and its wide adoption, many commentators suggest that the openness of 




B.  The Transformation of the Computer Industry 
The computer industry evolved from supplying integrated proprietary systems to a modular 
industry open to specialization and entry at different layers.  Initially, when IBM and other vertically-
integrated companies dominated the market, customers typically chose among single-vendor systems, 
normally relying, for example, on IBM peripherals to go with the IBM mainframes.
19  To keep its 
system closed, IBM kept secret and proprietary the interfaces between the different parts of its 
system.
20  In focusing on building and protecting its legacy mainframe products, however, IBM was 
slow to grasp the significance of the personal computer, which Apple developed and deployed in the 
late 1970s.
21 
When IBM did introduce its personal computer, it (perhaps almost by accident) used an open 
architecture model.
22  Whereas Apple relied on a closed business model, IBM relied on Microsoft and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17 See Dale Hatfield, Preface, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 1 (2000).  For a classic articulation of the principle, 
see Jerome H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS IN COMPUTER 
SYSTEMS 277 (1984), reprinted in INNOVATIONS IN INTERNETWORKING 195 (Craig Patridge ed., 1988). 
18 See Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 5 (OPP Working Paper No. 31, 1999), 
available at <http:// www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.txt>) (The Internet's "openness is 
driven by the sharing of that common communications protocol: IP, the Internet protocol, developed by early 
Internet pioneers. No one owns the Internet protocol no one licenses its use, and no one restricts access to it."). 
19 Particularly with its System 360, IBM emerged as the dominant firm in this market, leading commentators to 
refer to the eight leading firms in the proprietary, vertically-integrated computer industry as “Snow White and 
the Seven Dwarfs.”  Peter Huber, Loose Ends, 4-NOV MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (1995). 
20 See Langlois, supra note __, at 32. 
21 For a discussion of IBM’s failure to grasp the significance of the personal computer market, see CLAYTON 
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 108-110 (1997). 
22 See Langlois, supra note__, at 24 (explaining that the open architecture of the IBM PC did not result from any 
“conscious” design or strategy); see also ANNABELLE GAWER AND MICHAEL A. CUSAMANO,  PLATFORM   8
Intel to produce key components for its system and allowed them to license these components to other 
computer makers.  In this way, the industry began to change from a closed to an open or “Silicon 
Valley” business model, with different providers specializing in different components.
23   
This modular structure facilitated innovation in ways that had not been matched in the 
integrated structure.
24  New entrants could and did specialize in components where they excelled, 
ensuring a “rapid improvement in components, including not only the chips but various peripheral 
devices like hard disks and modems, as well as the proliferation of applications software, that has led 
to the rapid fall in the quality-adjusted price of the total personal computer system.”
25  Consequently, 




C.  The Development of Competition In Telecommunications   
It has been said that the modern era in telecommunications begins with the story of a plastic 
cup.
27  This cup, the “Hush-A-Phone,” was sold as a way to insulate telephone conversations against 
background noise.  The AT&T Bell System protested that this was a “foreign attachment” to its 
network and that the FCC should ban it.  The FCC agreed, concluding that the Hush-a-Phone was 
“deleterious to the telephone system” and that, in general, “telephone equipment should be supplied 
by and under control of the carrier.”
28  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC’s decision, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
LEADERSHIP:  HOW INTEL, MICROSOFT, AND CISCO DRIVE INDUSTRY INNOVATION 15-38 (2002) (explaining 
how Intel, along with Microsoft, emerged to provide platform leadership in this open architecture environment). 
23 See Grove, supra note __, at 39-52. 
24 See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND 
ROUTE 128 (1994). 
25 Richard N. Langlois, Technology Standards, Innovation, and Essential Facilities:  Towards A Schumpeterian 
Post-Chicago Approach, in Jerry Ellig (ed.) DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY:  TECHNOLOGY, 
INNOVATION, AND ANTITRUST ISSUES 215 (2001). 
26 See David P. Angel & James Engstrom, Manufacturing Systems and Technological Change:  The U.S. 
Personal Computer Industry, 71 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 79, 79, 81 (1995) (noting that market share of IBM and 
Apple declined from 1984 to 1992 from 52.5% to 21.4% and that average price of computers fell by 40% in 
1992 alone). 
27 Telecommunications “[d]eregulation began more or less with a rubber cup.”  RICHARD VIETOR, CONTRIVED 
COMPETITION 190 (1994). 
28 Hush-a- Phone Corp., 20 F.C.C. 391, 420 (1955), rev'd, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).   9
establishing the principle that the owner of the telephone network cannot restrict the use of reasonable 
attachments to the telephone network.
29 
In 1968, the Commission analogously held that AT&T could not prevent the use of a device 
called the Carterfone, which facilitated communication between a mobile radio and the landline 
network.
30  In so doing, the Commission announced a broad protection for all users to “interconnect” 
foreign devices to the telephone network.
31  To implement this principle, the Commission asked 
AT&T to file new tariffs that would allow the attachment of foreign devices to the network, provided 
that those devices would not harm the network.
32   
  In the wake of its Carterfone decision, the FCC and, later, the Department of Justice 
supported competitive entry into the long distance sector.  Much as in the terminal equipment market, 
entrants like MCI sought interconnection to the public switched network so that their customers could 
                                                           
29 Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).  It is often thought that the court 
established this principle over the FCC’s opposition.  In fact, the FCC ostensibly endorsed this principle, but 
absurdly agreed with AT&T’s claim that the Hush-A-Phone constituted a threat to the network.  Because the 
FCC’s decision effectively gutted the principle in its implementation, it may well be that the Commission did 
not really believe in this principle, though it gave it lip service.   
30 In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Servs., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).  This decision, in 
response to an antitrust case brought by the producers of the Carterfone, see Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
365 F.2d 486 (5
th Cir. 1966), ruled that AT&T’s restrictive tariff violated the Communications Act, see 13 
F.C.C.2d at 421 (outlining AT&T tariff providing that “[n]o equipment, apparatus, circuit, or device not 
furnished by the telephone company shall be attached to or connected with the facilities furnished by the 
telephone company, physically, by induction, or otherwise”).  In particular, the Commission found that the fact 
that AT&T allowed its own equipment to interconnect to the network rendered such restrictions discriminatory.  
Id. at 421-24. 
31 The Commission announced that: 
  
[A] customer desiring to use an interconnecting device to improve the utility to him of [the telephone 
network] . . . should be able to do so, so long as the interconnection does not adversely affect the 
telephone company's operations or the telephone system's utility for others.  
 
Id. at 424. 
32 AT&T took full advantage of the proviso allowing it to condition the use of attachments, requiring 
“protective connecting arrangements” (PCAs) that would limit greatly the use of non-AT&T equipment.  See 
American Tel. & Tel. Co. “Foreign Attachment” Tariff Revisions in AT&T Tariff FCC Nos. 263, 260, and 259, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 605, 606 (1968); see also Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 700 
F.2d 785, 799 n.15 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting AT&T internal report that the tariff requirements of employing 
PCAs were “a redundant, artificial, and economic barrier to those wishing to purchase their own equipment”); 
Northern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 95 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982) (concluding that 
AT&T may have designed PCAs in an unreasonable manner).   10
reach all telephone subscribers.
33  In both MCI’s private antitrust suit and the Justice Department’s 
action against AT&T, the courts concluded that AT&T must allow MCI to interconnect with its 
customers so that it could compete with AT&T’s long distance services.
34  Because the Department 
did not believe that equal access regulation alone would effectively safeguard long-distance 
competition, it also obtained the divestiture and quarantine of the local Bell Companies under the 
Modified Final Judgment or MFJ.
35  Taking advantage of the protections afforded by the decree, MCI 
and other entrants to the long distance market introduced new services – like fiber optics in the 
backbone network
36 – and tailored their offerings to customers who used their lines for data 
communications.   
                                                           
33 See Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969). 
34 See MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1105 (7
th Cir. 1983); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. 
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).  For a discussion of 
the exact nature of MCI’s interconnection concerns, see MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1131-32 
(discussing, among other things, MCI’s claim that AT&T required its customers to dial unnecessary digits and 
that AT&T’s interconnection procedures “utilized materials inadequate for the volume of business MCI was 
doing . . . and involved unduly complex and ineffective installation and maintenance procedures”). 
35 The MFJ’s basic logic, which is often called either “Baxter’s Law” or the “Bell Doctrine,” is that:   
 
(R)egulated monopolies have the incentive and opportunity to monopolize related markets in which 
their monopolized service is an input, and that the most effective solution to this problem is to 
'quarantine' the regulated monopoly segment of the industry by separating its ownership and control 
from the ownership and control of firms that operate in potentially competitive segments of the 
industry.  
 
Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine:  Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and 
Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50 (1999); see also Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall 
of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act:  Regulation of Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 1395, 
1415-16 (1999)(discussing the Department’s objections to a pure conduct remedy strategy); but see Robert W. 
Crandall, The Failure of Divestiture Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases, 80 OR. L. REV. 109, 179-
92 (2001) (arguing that equal access regulations alone, without divestiture and quarantine, would have ensured 
the MFJ’s competitive benefits). 
36 See Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technologies in U.S. Telecommunications, 
2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 107 (2000) (explaining that AT&T failed to deploy it in its long-haul network until 
Sprint and other upstarts did and began advertising a superior quality network).  As an executive from Corning 
explained: 
 
AT&T, which owned most of the telephone lines in America at the time [of the invention of fiber optic 
technology], said it would be 30 years before its telephone system would be ready for optical fiber.  
And when it was, AT&T planned to make its own fiber. . . . [After AT&T entered into a consent 
decree,] MCI took the risk [of ordering fiber optic technology] and placed a 100,000 kilometer order 
for a new generation of fiber. 
   11
 
D.  Modularity and The Logic For Open Access Regulation 
Modularity means organizing complements to interoperate through public, nondiscriminatory 
and well-understood interfaces.  As the cases described above suggest, modularity can arise as an 
internal management system, as a self-governing organization of a market, or as a result of public 
policy decisions.  In the computer industry and the development of the Internet, this strategy proved 
very successful in facilitating innovation and entry.  Similarly, with the breakup of the integrated Bell 
System, new companies were able to enter equipment and long distance markets successfully. 
Modular industry structures enable independent firms to introduce innovations into an 
established environment.  In particular, an open standard can facilitate innovation in individual 
components, spur entry, and result in lower prices.
37  Moreover, as producers experiment with 
different approaches, the market can move quickly based on “rapid trial-and-error learning.”
38  
Modularity thus allows for a smooth dissemination of the best of breed in each level or layer, as users 
mix-and-match components.
39 
In the three cases sketched out above, modularity arose through different means, but in each 
case the modular structure seemed to facilitate innovation.  Open standards and interfaces in the 
telecommunications and Internet industries, for example, have enabled companies to launch new 
products (such as modems) that work with the telephone network, and new applications – notably, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Willard K. Tom & Joshua Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property:  From Separate Spheres to A Unified 
Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 202 (1997) (quoting Testimony of Timothy J. Regan, Division Vice President 
and Director of Public Policy, Corning, Inc., Before House Judiciary Committee (May 9, 1995)). 
37 Joseph Farrell et al, The Vertical Organization of Industry:  Systems Competition Versus Component 
Competition, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 143, 172-73 (1998). 
38 Richard N. Langlois & Paul L. Robertson, Networks and Innovation In A Modular System:  Lessons From 
The Microcomputer and Stereo Component Industries, 21 RESEARCH POLICY 297, 301 (1992). 
39 As Clayton Christensen put it: 
  
Modular architectures help companies respond to individual customer needs and introduce new 
products faster by upgrading individual subsystems without having to redesign everything.  Under 
these conditions (and only under these conditions), outsourcing titans like Dell and Cisco Systems can 
prosper—because modular architectures help them be fast, flexible and responsive. 
 
Clayton M. Christensen, The Rules of Innovation, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 33, 36 (June 2002).    12
World Wide Web – that work over the Internet.
40  Given its success in facilitating innovation in these 
and other cases, some commentators -- notably Lawrence Lessig -- argue that government policy 
should facilitate modularity wherever possible.
41  
As Part II discusses, however, making modularity a guiding light for regulatory policy 
clashes with the thrust of modern economic thinking and antitrust policy.  In particular, Part II 
explains the logic of a critical antitrust economic concept -- internalizing complementary externalities 
(ICE) – and why it claims that firms have an incentive to implement modularity voluntarily when it is 
efficient to do so. 
 
II.  Integration and Efficiencies:  Putting the Modularity Movement on ICE 
Perhaps partly because modularity has many efficiency and competitive benefits, antitrust 
policy until the 1970s was wary of (incremental) vertical integration and imposed per se rules that 
limited vertical relationships.
42  Over the last twenty-five years, however, antitrust policy has 
accepted the Chicago School argument that close vertical relationships also give rise to “integrative 
efficiencies.”  Even more importantly, economists’ better understanding of complementarities has led 
antitrust law to recognize that the benefits of modularity will often cause firms to institute it 
voluntarily.  The question for regulators therefore is not whether modularity is good—it very often 
                                                           
40 See Jay Atkinson & Christopher C. Barnekov, A Competitively Neutral Approach to Network 
Interconnection, Federal Communications Commission Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper # 34, 6 
(December 2000) (available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp34.pdf) (explaining 
this point). 
41 LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note __, at 174-76; Lawrence Lessig, Innovation, Regulation, and the 
Internet, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (April 10, 2000) <http://www.prospect.org/archives/V11-10/lessig-1.html> 
(“the burden should be on those who would compromise [on openness] to show that it will not take away from 
the innovation we have seen so far”).  In a report to the government of Canada, for example, T.M. Denton 
Consultants argued: 
 
It might be questioned whether governments had interests to defend here.  The justification for taking 
an interest is that the future operation of networks may well determine how economies will function, 
and is therefore a matter of national importance.  Governments are guardians of the marketplace, and 
they have legitimate interests in knowing how they work.  In a computer-mediated marketplace, 
interfaces between networks determine who may compete. 
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is—but whether modularity is likely to be good even when it will not emerge (or survive) 
spontaneously, as often it will when it is most valuable. 
This Part explains the efficiencies and logic behind allowing firms (even monopolists) to 
decide whether or not to integrate vertically into—or, more broadly, depart from an arm’s-length 
relationship with—complementary markets.  While it is sometimes convenient to talk as if platform 
firms choose between full integration and an arm’s-length modular relationship with a complement, 
there is, of course, a spectrum of vertical relationships between these, including partial integration 
(i.e., a joint venture), a tie-in arrangement, an investment in a firm producing a complement, a long 
term contractual arrangement, and an affiliate relationship.   
As we outline in Section A, a vertical relationship closer than an arm’s-length modular one 
can achieve certain efficiency benefits.  Moreover, as discussed in Section B, the powerful concept of 
“internalizing complementary efficiencies,” or ICE, explains why even a platform monopoly often 
has incentives to make efficiency-oriented choices about when to maintain modularity and when to 
get involved in an adjacent market. 
 
A. Integrative  Efficiencies 
Palm, which introduced the first successful personal digital assistant, recently decided to 
separate its operating system and software applications divisions from its hardware division.
43  It did 
so because it did not want to be another Apple, which failed to commit to an open licensing strategy 
for its operating system and subsequently lost its initially strong market share.
44  Quite naturally, it 
wants to be another Microsoft:  a firm that has benefited enormously from modularity and the 
development of independent applications for its platform. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See T.M. DENTON CONSULTANTS, NETHEADS VERSUS BELLHEADS, FINAL REPORT FOR THE CANADIAN FEDERAL 
DEPT. OF INDUSTRY 15 (available at www.tmdenton.com/netheads.htm).   
42 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
43 See Ian Fried and Dawn Kawamoto, Two Palms Better Than One? CNET NEWS.COM (February 4, 2002) 
(available at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-828446.html#). 
44 See Pui-Wing Tam, For Palm, Splitting In Two Isn’t Seamless, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002 at B4.   14
Palm’s decision to vertically disintegrate, compared with Apple’s apparent error, might 
appear to be a no-brainer.  But it is not.  By separating its operations vertically, Palm will lose control 
of a number of potentially important aspects of its product deployment.  Take, for instance, its ability 
to prod development of valuable applications.  For Palm, its heavy reliance on outsiders and “inability 
to crack the whip on its far-flung programmers” contributes (according to some observers) to its 
“slow pace of innovation.”
45  By reducing its size and influence over complementors, Palm may find 
influencing independent developers even more difficult in the future.  In contrast, Sega developed the 
operating system, equipment, and leading games for its Sega Genesis system all in-house – in 
particular, its Sonic the Hedgehog game – in order to control its product offerings and drive consumer 
demand for its system.
46 
Where there are interdependencies between the platform and the applications made for it, an 
arm’s-length relationship can predictably involve contractual hazards of hold-up on both sides.
 47  A 
closer vertical relationship can be a rational and efficient response to such hazards.  In this sense, 
developing close vertical relationships often represents a second-best strategy.
48   
One important efficiency created by vertical integration is the avoidance of what economists 
call “double marginalization.”  The classic formulation, offered by Augustin Cournot and dating back 
to 1838, is that separate complementary monopolies, each imposing a monopoly markup, wind up 
with a final product price that exceeds the overall monopoly price.  As a result, where firms enjoy 
                                                           
45 Erick Schonfeld & Ian Mount, Beating Bill, BUSINESS 2.0 (June 2002) (available at 
www.business2.com/articles/mag/print/0,1643,40438,FF.html). 
46 See ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION 237-241 (1996).  One possible 
explanation for these differing approaches is that the proprietary strategy is most effective in getting a system 
off the ground, but, as Palm is discovering, it is difficult to later separate integrated divisions that once worked 
well together and it is not easy to determine when, if at all, integration has outlined its usefulness.  See Tam, 
supra note __. 
47 See Yoo, supra note __, at 262-64 (noting that vertical integration guards against free riding, holdup 
problems, and other strategic behaviors by vital complementors).   
48 More precisely, the problem arises when fully effective modularity is not available, so that ex post haggling is 
likely to arise.  There is thus apt to be an intriguing positive feedback:  when modularity works well, it is 
appealing and may be stable, but when it starts to break down, a platform supplier’s best response may 
eventually be to integrate—plausibly killing off whatever imperfect modularity remains.  For an examination of 
how Intel approached this problem, see ANNABELLE GAWER AND MICHAEL A. CUSAMANO,  PLATFORM 
LEADERSHIP:  HOW INTEL, MICROSOFT, AND CISCO DRIVE INDUSTRY INNOVATION 54-56 (2002).    15
monopolies in complementary markets, both consumers and the producers are worse off than they 
would be if the two firms merged and charged a monopoly price for the two goods used in 
combination.
49  More generally, this insight explains that firms which provide complements or 
complementary activities are in a mutual position of “vertical externality.”  When Microsoft, for 
example, improves its software or lowers its price, more consumers buy Intel’s complementary 
microprocessor; similarly, when Intel improves its hardware or lowers its price, demand for 
Microsoft’s operating system rises.  Thus, when complementors move closer to maximizing joint 
profits -- whether through integration or through a closer contractual relationship than arm’s-length 
pricing -- it tends to encourage innovation and price-cutting.
50  
In technology industries, another important integrative efficiency is that hand-in-glove 
coordination among complementors can often produce superior products.
51  Where an industry relies 
on open standards and open interfaces, it can be hard to innovate quickly in a way that requires 
changing the interface.
52  Antitrust law, even at the height of its hostility to vertical tie-ins, 
appreciated this point in a case involving the rollout of cable television and its related equipment.
53   
Hand-in-glove coordination between complements also addresses consumer skepticism about 
trying a new platform product where they must purchase the relevant applications separately.  
Platform providers may either produce the applications themselves or require some form of quality 
screening as part of a licensing arrangement to assure consumers that complementary products will 
                                                           
49 AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 103 
(1838) (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., MacMillan Co. 1927). 
50 For a development of this point and some important refinements of it, see Joseph Farrell and Michael L. Katz, 
Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration of Systems Markets, 48 J. IND. ECON. 413 (2000).  In particular, it 
merits noting explicitly that when competitors—in contrast to complementors—move closer to maximizing 
joint profits, the result can much more readily be anticompetitive. 
51 For the classic work arguing that intellectual property holders should be able to control the development and 
deployment of complementary products, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the 
 Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 287 (1977).  For a more recent application of this argument, see Douglas 
Lichtman, Property Rights In Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615 (2000). 
52 For a development of this theme and a discussion of the virtues of proprietary platform competition, see 
Weiser, Intellectual Property Policy, supra note __, at __-__; see also note __, infra.  For a further discussion of 
how developing stable interfaces can be too expensive and time consuming to merit the effort, see Langlois, 
supra note __, at 23.   16
work effectively.  (Indeed, Palm may have adopted this strategy as a means of introducing its product 
before moving to implement modularity through its voluntary split.)  Moreover, such coordination 
can give a platform provider more scope for penetration pricing and other tactics aimed to encourage 
efficient use and adoption of its platform,
54 particularly when the product is newly introduced and 
relatively unknown. 
Businesses’ choice of vertical structure are are a mainstay of the “new institutional 
economics” (NIE), which develops the basic insights offered by the work of Nobel Laureate Ronald 
Coase.
55  NIE suggests that firms will vertically integrate– or, more generally, depart from arm’s-
length market dealing -- in cases where the use of the market would be costly.
56  Thus, NIE aims to 
explain when firms will opt for modularity as a means of bringing the maximum imagination and 
diversity to the problem of developing applications on a platform and minimizing the need for 
complex coordination, versus vertical integration to facilitate complex coordination and to strengthen 
incentives for product development and deployment.
57 
Unfortunately, firms cannot readily get the best of both worlds.  Thus, when platform 
providers integrate but want to encourage independent applications development, they often end up 
taking pains “not to compete with customers.”
58  Consider again Palm’s decision to place its operating 
system into a separate company.  As commentators have observed, this measure is designed to help 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
53 See United States v. Jerrolds Elec. Corp., 187 F.Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 
(1961) (allowing leeway for bundling in introducing new product where reputation matters). 
54 For a discussion of this point, see Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights In Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 
J. LEGAL STUD. 615, __-__ (2000). 
55 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Ronald H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  The subject is also known as “transactions cost economics.” 
56 For discussions of this point and citations to relevant literature, see Alan J. Messe, Tying Meets The New 
Institutional Economics:  Farewell To The Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 50-66 (1997); Gregory J. 
Werden, The Law and Economics of The Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 462-464 (1987). 
57 Because it is seldom obvious which of these two strategies is superior, antitrust courts have waded carefully 
into the area of “technological tying,” requiring plaintiffs to establish that any competitive harms outweigh the 
efficiencies produced by such developments.  See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53 
(2001); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F.Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d sub nom. 
Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9
th Cir. 1980); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 347 (N.D. 
Okl. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10
th Cir. 1975). 
58 This phrasing is most natural when the platform product is sold to the applications developers, who then sell a 
combined product downstream.  As we discuss at the outset, the same issues arise whether this is the market   17
reassure its licensees (like Handspring) that it can be trusted as a steward over the standard, it will not 
take advantage of its control over the platform to give it an advantage in related markets, and it will 
remain focused on serving the needs of independent developers – particularly now that Microsoft’s 
rival operating system is offered on a modular basis (i.e., without a hardware component).
59  
Similarly, AT&T divested its equipment manufacturing arm, Lucent, perhaps to reassure those 




  B.  ICE and The Rationale Against Open Access Regulation 
If a monopoly platform provider (for whatever reason) sticks to its core platform business, it 
would prefer that applications—the complements to its product—be cheaply, innovatively, and 
efficiently supplied.  Thus, where such a firm chooses how to license interface information, certify 
complementors or not, “evangelize,” etc., it has an incentive to choose the pattern that will best 
provide it or its customers with applications.  It can internalize these complementary efficiencies.  
This lesson may seem obvious, although antitrust law has not always appreciated it;
61 we call this 
point Obvious ICE. 
  Obvious ICE can be understood more sharply by using a quantitative example involving a 
platform monopolist in the game console market.
62  Assume, for exposition purposes, that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
structure, or whether the platform provider buys from the applications developers, or whether end users or 
intermediaries buy both products.  See note __, supra, and accompanying text. 
59 See Ian Fried and Dawn Kawamoto, Two Palms Better Than One? CNET NEWS.COM (February 4, 2002) 
(available at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-828446.html#). 
60 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES (1998); ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY 
J. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION (1996). 
61 Judge Posner makes this point sharply in discussing Dr Miles, a case that addressed the antitrust rule 
governing minimum resale price maintenance.  See RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 177-78 (2001). 
62 In antitrust, a company need not control 100% of a market (and even “market” is a nuanced term of art) to be 
considered a “monopolist”; rather, being a “monopolist” merely connotes that a company possesses a 
considerable degree of control over prices and output (and/or the ability to exclude competitors).  See United 
States v. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (defining “monopoly power” as "power to control prices or 
exclude competition").  For a discussion of “monopoly power” and when a firm is a monopolist, see RICHARD 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 195-96 (2001) (noting, among other things, that courts often use market shares of 
50%-70% as threshold indicators of when a firm is a monopolist); see also SEE AM. BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST   18
competition in the applications market (i.e., video games for a game console) will ensure a selection 
of applications that gives each user of the platform a value of $100; by contrast, assume that a 
monopoly in applications will provide each platform purchaser a value of only $70.  (This value 
reflects the quality, variety, and price of the available applications, and is measured assuming that the 
platform is already purchased.)  Then, if the platform provider decides not to foster competition in the 
applications market, the platform’s value to a buyer falls by $30; consequently, the platform provider 
must either sell fewer platforms or lower its platform price by $30.  As a result, the platform provider 
internalizes a quantitative measure (here $30) of the complementary efficiencies from a more valued 
applications market (hence the term ICE).
63 
  Obvious ICE neither proves nor assumes that competition in applications markets is efficient.  
If, for instance, it is exceptionally hard to avoid spillovers of innovation among applications 
developers, then competition between applications developers might lead to less rather than more 
innovation.  Or, if it is hard for consumers to judge the quality of applications, free entry into 
marketing applications could spoil the market for all applications providers.  If, as in those examples, 
a competitive applications market would yield less value than a monopolized one, the monopoly 
platform provider would benefit by preventing competition in the market for applications.  Thus, 
Obvious ICE does not tell us what structure of the applications market is optimal, but simply observes 
that the un-integrated platform monopolist has an incentive to favor whichever form of organization 
of applications is most efficient (or delivers the most value to users).  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 235-36 (4th ed. 1997) (noting the 50% and 70% benchmarks and citing supporting federal 
case law); id. at 238 & n.45 (listing factors relevant for monopoly power determination such as "presence and 
degree of barriers to entry or expansion, technological superiority resulting in cost advantages, economies of 
scale and scope, ability to price discriminate, the relative size of competitors, competitors' performance, pricing 
trends and practices, homogeneity of products, potential competition, and the stability of market shares over 
time"); United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659 (9
th Cir. 1990) (even 86% market share not sufficient 
to constitute a monopoly where entry is easy). 
63 The argument as formulated yields a slightly sharper conclusion than is usually stated.  First, it is the 
incremental value of the marginal platform purchaser that counts.  Second, if the platform provider chooses a 
different price strategy than that described, it will more than capture the advantage of the more efficient 
downstream organization.   19
  Obvious ICE does not address the concerns that arise when the platform monopolist does 
integrate into (and remain in) the market for applications for its platform.
64  In such cases, the 
platform provider will often be able to take a dominant position in that business.  First, it has a 
stronger incentive than an independent firm to work harder on its applications, since innovators can 
seldom capture all their incremental value through simple pricing, and (as ICE reminds us) the 
integrated provider can capture some—perhaps all—of the residue in its platform sales.  Second, even 
if a platform provider genuinely tries to cooperate with independent applications developers, it is 
unlikely to be as open with them as with its own applications division (unless it were deliberately to 
build a “Chinese wall” to withhold information from the latter).  Third, if the integrated firm wanted 
to hamstring applications rivals, it would often be very easy -- blatantly or subtly -- to bias interface 
design, the timing of new releases, details of pricing policy, and many other choices -- and these 
subtleties would only be necessary if blunter means were somehow ruled out.  In the face of such 
possibilities, some argue that a platform provider’s decision to integrate vertically poses a formidable 
competitive concern.   
But a stronger and less obvious extension of the ICE principle claims that the platform 
monopolist will act efficiently even when it comes to deciding whether or not to integrate, and, if it 
integrates, how to treat its applications competitors.  Thus, according to this unobvious conception of 
ICE, close vertical relationships do not raise an economic policy concern.   
Suppose, using the hypothetical set out above, that the platform provider could integrate into 
applications, participate in the competitive market, and improve the value to users from $100 to $105, 
while breaking even on its applications.  Under this scenario, the platform provider will profit from 
vertical integration—just as it should, since by hypothesis it leads to increased value.  Suppose, on the 
other hand, that it contemplates integrating into applications, monopolizing that market, and making a 
profit of $20 per user there.  Because $20 is less than the $30 harm created by this action—harm that 
                                                           
64 This need not be literal integration; alliances with particular applications developers could also raise such 
concerns.  Recognizing this point, this Article often discusses “close vertical relationships” as opposed to the   20
is in the first instance to applications buyers, but that redounds to the platform monopolist’s bottom 
line because consumers will be willing to pay less for the platform—it will lose by such a strategy, as 
it should since, by hypothesis, it leads to lower consumer value.  To be sure, a platform provider 
would choose to monopolize the applications market if it can make $40 (per user) rather than $20 in 
doing so, but, by hypothesis, this monopolization would somehow increase rather than decrease total 
value.
65 
At bottom, ICE maintains that consumers will not pay more whether or not the applications 
market is monopolized, because the platform monopoly could always have charged consumers more 
(in the platform price) in the first place.  Consequently, ICE suggests that the platform provider has 
no incentive to take profits or inefficiently hamper or exclude rivals in the applications market 
because it can appropriate the benefits of cheap and attractive applications in its pricing of the 
platform.  To the contrary, ICE underscores why a platform monopolist has a formidable incentive to 
innovate and push for improvements in its system – including better applications – in order to gain 
more profits from a more valuable platform.
66 
For a number of reasons, firms may hesitate to enter an applications market where they must 
compete with the platform provider.  More generally, efficient applications competition can be 
problematic if one of the competitors controls the platform.  In such cases, ICE teaches that platform 
providers may choose to stay out of (or later exit from) the applications market altogether as a means 
of ensuring efficient competition in that market.  (Palm’s recent break-up may well have just this 
objective.) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
traditional term “vertical integration.” 
65 That is, the platform provider makes an extra $40 per user at the cost of only $30 per user reduced value.  
Admittedly, the assertion that this increases total value rides on an assumption that excluded applications firms 
do not capture more than the $10 in pure profits. 
66 See, e.g., Microsoft, 65 F.Supp.2d at 17 (“[I]f there are innovations that will make Intel-compatible PC 
systems more attractive to more consumers, and those consumers will be less sensitive to the price of Windows, 
the innovations will translate into increased profits for Microsoft.”).   21
  The un-obvious ICE argument that monopoly platform providers can generally be trusted to 
act efficiently is often called the “one monopoly profit theory.”
67  It dates back to early Chicago 
School thinking,
68 which underlay much of Richard Posner’s work in the 1970s and Robert Bork’s 
arguments in the Antitrust Paradox.
69  It implies that a monopoly platform provider’s decision to 
integrate into a complementary market, and its behavior there if it does so, is likely to be efficient and 
not anticompetitive.   
The “one monopoly profit theory”
70 label captures only part of the analysis suggested by ICE.  
It explains that a platform monopolist cannot increase its profits by “leveraging” that power into 
applications; it thus focuses on ICE’s claim that where competition in the applications market is 
efficient, the platform monopolist will protect it.  But the “one monopoly profit” label fails to suggest 
the broader principle that the platform monopolist gains from an efficient applications market—
whether that be unbridled competition, integration without independents, licensing of a limited set of 
independents, or some attempt to combine these or other structures.  Our term internalization of 
complementary efficiencies stresses that the platform monopolist has a powerful incentive to be a 
good steward of the applications sector for its platform; it thus better captures the argument against 
restrictions on vertical ties than the “one monopoly profit” phrase. 
                                                           
67 Judge Posner has outlined the argument succinctly: 
 
But the bare fact that a firm has monopoly power in Market X does not imply that it will have an 
incentive to obtain monopoly power over Y, an input into X. In general a monopolist like any other 
firm wants to minimize its input costs; the lower those costs are, the greater the monopoly profits it 
will be able to make. Therefore the rational monopolist will usually want his input markets to be 
competitive, for competition usually will minimize the costs that he has to pay for his inputs. 
 
Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1986); see also 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, at 200-02. 
68 See Bowman, supra note __.  
69 See, e.g., Bork, supra note __; Posner, supra note __. 
70 See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 229 (1978) ("[V]ertically related monopolies can take only one 
monopoly profit"); RICHARD POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 870 (2d ed. 1989) ("There is only 
one monopoly profit to be made in a chain of production.").  Judges, too, have used the “one monopoly profit” 
label.  See, e.g., Town of Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.); 
Western Resources, Inc. v. Surface Transportation Board, 109 F.3d 782, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J.).    22
  The stronger form of ICE largely explains modern antitrust law's reluctance to worry broadly 
about leveraging and spillovers of market power.  It also underlies the basics of Chicago School 
doctrine,
71 as well as its more ambitious arguments for per se legality of tying arrangements.
72  
Surprisingly (and, as we see below, not necessarily correctly), it suggests that antitrust and regulation 
should generally not worry even if an integrated firm engages in behavior that is plainly exclusionary 
if assessed entirely within the applications market.   
Courts and commentators have often heeded the basic ICE argument for skepticism about 
claims that a monopolist would “leverage” its primary monopoly into a second market.
73  In doing so, 
they have adopted a somewhat simplistic form of this logic that does not address fully ICE’s 
exceptions.  In particular, some take ICE very seriously, others take its exceptions very seriously,
74 
but few integrate the two in a sophisticated manner.  In light of this divide, a central question for 
antitrust and regulatory policy is whether ICE represents the rule, with exceptions relatively rare or 
minor, or whether ICE is actually the exception.
75  To outline this debate, Part III explains the thrust 
of post-Chicago criticisms of ICE and where ICE’s implications must be taken with some caution. 
 
III.    Holes in the ICE and When ICE’s Logic Can Fail 
                                                           
71 The classic statement of this position came in Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage 
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).  The orthodox restatement of it came in ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX 372-74 (1978). 
72 Bork, supra note __, at 288 (arguing that all vertical restraints, like tying, should be per se legal). 
73 See, e.g., G.K.A. Beverage Corp. v. Honickman, 55 F.3d 762, 767 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Once having achieved the 
alleged bottling monopoly, therefore, appellees’ sole incentive is to select the cheapest method of 
distribution.”); Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1203 (3d Cir. 1995) (arguing that 
leveraging theory “makes no sense”). 
74 For two classic responses to Chicago School thinking, see Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and Vertical Strategies By Dominant Firms, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1992); Louis Kaplow, Extension of 
Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985). 
75 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust:  A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257   
(“The principal difference between Chicago and post- Chicago economic analysis is” the prevalence of “a 
complex set of assumptions about how a market works, [which make] anticompetitive outcomes seem more 
plausible.”); see also RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 194-95 (2001) (maintaining that policy deviations 
from ICE should be the exception, not the rule).  To be sure, there are a few “die-hard” Chicagoans who believe 
that vertical arrangements can never have anticompetitive effects (i.e., believe that there are no exceptions to 
ICE), but most commentators recognize the heavy weight of economic opinion agrees that vertical integration 
and vertical market restrictions can injure competition in certain cases.  See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago   23
ICE is a central organizing principle for the analysis of vertical competitive effects.  But its 
claims do not always hold.  In this Part, we explain some ways in which it can fail.  First, we discuss 
the series of exceptions to ICE’s logic.  Second, we reflect on the implications of these exceptions for 
using ICE in developing sound regulatory and antitrust policy.  
 
A.  Holes in the ICE 
This Part will evaluate eight exceptions to the ICE principle: (1) Baxter’s Law; (2) price 
discrimination; (3) potential competition; (4) bargaining problems; (5) incompetent incumbents; (6) 
option value; (7) regulatory strategy; and (8) incomplete complementarity.  There are other 
exceptions,
76 but we find these ones particularly noteworthy and relevant to the information industries 
regulated by both antitrust and telecommunications law. 
 
(1) Baxter’s  Law 
Even classical Chicago School adherents concede an exception to ICE where the platform 
(the core monopoly) is subject to regulation but the applications market is not.
77  The economics 
behind this exception to ICE echo the ICE argument itself.  ICE claims that a monopolist can capture 
in its platform profits improvements in consumer value in applications, but it generally cannot if the 
platform price is regulated.  First, suppose that there is an “ideal” price cap that merely constrains the 
price of the platform product and that will not change if platform-level profits change over time.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932 (1979) (discussing “die-hard” Chicagoans who refuse 
to accept subsequent refinements of early Chicago School ideas). 
76 For one such different formulation, see Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly:  
Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 625 n.26 (1999) (listing 
situations). 
77 See Olympia, 797 F.2d at 374 (“There are, however, special circumstances in which a rational monopolist 
may want to restrict competition in an input market; as it happens, one of those circumstances is where the 
monopolist's rates are regulated.”); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 36 n. 4 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In a 
regulated industry a firm with market power may be unable to extract a supercompetitive profit because it lacks 
control over the prices it charges for regulated products or services. Tying may then be used to extract that 
profit from sale of the unregulated, tied products or services.") (citations omitted).  Bowman’s initial argument 
contemplated this exception, see Bowman, supra note __, at 22, but later commentators criticized his treatment 
of this argument as too deferential to the regulatory process.  See Kaplow, supra note __, at 522 n.26.   24
Now consider how the regulated platform monopolist will view an opportunity to raise the price of 
applications and take a profit there.  Assuming fixed 1:1 proportions between the platform and the 
applications market, suppose that the platform provider can take an additional profit of $10 per unit in 
the applications market by monopolizing that market.  As ICE stresses, this lowers the profit-
maximizing price for its platform by $10 (in the simplest case), given the level of platform sales.  But 
whereas this “normally” lowers platform profits by $10, it may have a far smaller effect on platform 
profits when the platform price is regulated below the profit-maximizing level.
 78  In a sense, the 
platform provider can compensate for the fact that its platform is priced below the profit-maximizing 
price by taking additional – and possibly otherwise inefficient -- profits in the applications market.  
The same basic point holds under various other forms of price regulation.  Suppose, for 
example, that the platform provider is regulated in a rate-of-return fashion, or is regulated by a price 
cap that responds over time to changes in profits in the platform market.  In either case, by raising the 
price of its application product by $10 and gaining profits there, a platform provider can gain on net 
even if in the short term its profits in the platform market would fall by the full $10, because the 
regulatory process will over time make its platform operations whole and restore that “lost” $10.   
This exception to ICE has been central in telecommunications policy.
79  In particular, the Bell 
System allegedly leveraged its way to market power in complementary markets in various ways, 
refusing to allow competitors in long distance and equipment manufacturing to gain equal access to 
its network.
80  Thus AT&T was able to rent telephones to its customers and/or sell equipment from its 
                                                           
78 The loss of demand is the $1 divided by the absolute slope of the demand curve, so it is -dx/dp, or (-dx/dp)/x 
per unit sales.  Multiplying by the gross margin (p-MC) gives (p-MC)(-dx/dp)/x, or [(p-MC)/p] * (-p/x dx/dp).  
This is the Lerner markup index times the absolute elasticity of demand; this amounts to 1 if p is profit-
maximizing, and is less than 1 if p is below the profit-maximizing level.  
79 This issue also emerged in cases involving railroad regulation.  See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1, 8 (1958) (noting that land grant sales conditioned on “preferential commitments” might well be an 
example of a tie used as a substitute for an unlawful rebate); see also Kaplow, supra note __, at 522 n.26. 
80 See Roger Noll & Bruce Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE 
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290 (J. E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).  In theory, an ideal "global price 
cap" could restore ICE, but much modern telecommunications regulation rarely focuses on this goal, instead 
aiming to deregulate workably competitive segments.  For more extensive discussions of the relationship of ICE 
to regulation, see JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2000); B. 
DOUGLAS BERNHEIM AND ROBERT D. WILLIG, THE SCOPE OF COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1996);   25
Western Electric affiliate to its operating companies or telephone subscribers at inflated rates; the 
resulting decrease in demand for telephone subscription did little to dissuade AT&T from such 
strategies because of the price regulation of local telephone service.  In its Carterfone decision and its 
aftermath, the FCC imposed an “unbundling” requirement on AT&T to prevent it from requiring 
consumers to rent phones from it, and thereby opened the customer premises equipment market to 
competition.
81   
This issue also was at the heart of the government’s antitrust case against AT&T, even 
though AT&T’s long distance rates – like its local ones – were regulated.
82  Because then-Assistant 
Attorney General Baxter highlighted this hole in ICE in championing the consent decree that broke up 
AT&T, this exception is also termed “Baxter’s Law” or the “Bell Doctrine.”
83 
  
(2) Price  Discrimination 
Participating in, or dominating, the applications market can help a platform monopolist to 
price discriminate; that may make even inefficient vertical leveraging profitable.
84  By controlling 
how applications are sold, a platform monopolist can engage in price discrimination by charging 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
MARK ARMSTRONG , SIMON COWAN & JOHN VICKERS, REGULATORY REFORM: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND 
BRITISH EXPERIENCE (1994). 
81 See note __ and accompanying text, supra. 
82 AT&T was federally regulated as a dominant carrier in the interstate long-distance market until 1995.  See 
Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 3271, 3280-82 
(1995) (ending rate regulation of AT&T in the long distance market).  The fact that AT&T actually faced 
regulation in its complementary markets – both in long distance and, in some cases, in CPE – suggests that this 
justification for regulatory action is more complicated than often appreciated.  In particular, there are three 
possible variations on this classic explanation that would grapple with this complication.  First, it is possible 
that areas where regulation did not address – such as certain CPE markets, particularly where AT&T sold 
equipment to itself – were open to abuses.  Second, it is possible that the imperfect nature of regulation enabled 
the AT&T monopoly to take greater advantage of consumers by providing both the monopoly and 
complementary service – i.e., the end of vertical integration helped consumers by facilitating better regulation.  
Finally, it is possible that the ability to prevent competition aided AT&T’s ability to forestall innovation in 
complementary markets that would force it to depreciate its sunk investments more quickly than it would in a 
monopoly environment. 
83 See note __, supra. 
84 Proponents of the “leverage theory” of tying regularly invoke this explanation.  See Lawrence A. Sullivan, 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Vertical Strategies By Dominant Firms, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1237 
(1992); Kaplow, supra note __, at 523 (“practices merely increasing profits to an existing monopoly, without 
`extending’ it, can increase the welfare loss that results”).   26
different markups on combinations of the platform with different sets of applications.
85  Put in 
economic terms, a seller can customize its offerings for different buyers, thereby distinguishing 
between those “inframarginal” customers who are willing to pay more than the “marginal” customers 
who would switch to other alternatives in the face of a price increase.
86   A familiar example of price 
discrimination is in airline travel, where airlines use a variety of means to segment the market and 
extract premium prices from the inframarginal customers who most desire the product – e.g., the 
business traveler who cannot plan in advance. 
While price discrimination need not in itself be inefficient or anti-consumer, the platform 
monopolist’s desire to discriminate can lead it to exclude innovation or price competition in 
complementary products.  In the classic case, it does so more or less intentionally where maximizing 
its profits involves large markups on (certain) complements – say, better meal service for first class 
passengers -- because in order to price discriminate in this manner, the monopolist must remain in full 
control of the complementary market.
87  In other cases, it may do so reluctantly when (as is also very 
possible) profit maximization involves below-cost pricing of complements:  for those cases, the 
platform provider probably would be delighted if independent complementors were to offer cheap and 
innovative offerings, but independent developers may refrain from providing such products where the 
platform provider offers its own complements below cost.
88 
Economists recognize that price discrimination is ambiguous in its aggregate effect because it 
can either harm or benefit consumers overall (and is likely to harm some and benefit others).
89  Much 
                                                           
85 As is becoming more common in the Internet environment, customer identity might be more readily tracked 
through the complement than through the platform product. 
86 For a discussion and explanation of the difference between “marginal” and “inframarginal” customers, see 
James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products:  The Need For A Workable Standard, 63 
ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 739-45 (1995). 
87 This, of course, does not explain why the platform monopolist does not welcome independent innovation, but 
co-opt and tame it.  But that approach may well be hard to do. 
88 See Farrell and Katz, supra note __ (formally modeling such an effect).  A platform provider could 
alternatively offer a uniform subsidy to independent as well as its own complements, which would perhaps 
avoid this problem but might raise others. 
89 See Posner, Chicago School of Antitrust, supra note __, at 926, 928 (explaining how price discrimination can 
bring a monopolistic market closer to a competitive one and reduce the “misallocative effects of monopoly”).  
Moreover, where the increased output can generate economies of scale and/or “learning by doing” efficiencies,   27
like Ramsey pricing, it can raise profits at the lowest possible cost to consumers as a group,
90 and this 
is valuable where profits provide an important incentive for research and development and the 
deployment of new technologies.
91  One should also remember that in the face of restrictions on tying, 
monopolists may well find other (and potentially less efficient) means of price discrimination.
92  
Finally, it merits note that firms without monopoly power also engage in price discrimination.
93 
Because modern economic thought is not hostile to price discrimination, some commentators 
categorically discount price discrimination as an exception to the logic of ICE.
94  But this is a 
mistake.  Even where the price discrimination itself enhances efficiency, the platform monopolist 
may impose highly inefficient restrictions on applications competition in order to engage in price 
discrimination, particularly where there is a history of a consumer willingness to pay for products in a 
certain manner.  A possible example is the unwillingness of cable providers to allow streaming video 
applications to use their cable modems.  ICE would suggest that cable providers should happily 
endorse this usage of their platform, as it would raise the potential profits available from this 
platform.  The hole in this argument is that a cable provider who allows video streaming will find it 
harder to engage in the profitable and customary price discrimination that sets high markups for 
premium cable programming, leading them to consider banning (or disadvantaging) this method of 
distribution altogether.
95 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
unit cost of production will drop as a result.  See Jerry Hausman & Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, Price 
Discrimination and Patent Policy, 19 RAND J. OF ECON. 253, 257 (Summer, 1988). 
90 As Justice Breyer explained, "Ramsey pricing is a classical regulatory pricing system that assigns fixed costs 
in a way that helps maintain services for customers who cannot (or will not) pay higher prices."  AT&T v. Iowa 
Util. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 752, (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
91 See Hausman & MacKie-Mason, supra note__, at 263 (allowing for price discrimination in the sale of a 
patented product can spur innovation and thus substitute for longer intellectual property protection). 
92 See Hal Varian, Price Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION __ (Schmalensee and 
Willig, eds., 1989); Hausman & MacKie-Mason, supra note__, at __. 
93 The price discrimination and market segmentation strategy of non-cable incumbents provides some evidence 
for this possibility.  See Tiffany Kane, Legislators Laud Debut of Covad’s Service, CNET News.com (June 19, 
2002) (http://news.com.com/2100-1033-937523.html) (reporting on Covad’s tiered pricing structure). 
94 See, e.g., Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24; Bork, supra note __, at 241-42; POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra 
note __, at 203-06. 
95 For an anectodal suggestion that cable providers may fear such effects.  See David Lieberman, Media Giants’ 
Net Change Establish Strong Foothold Online, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 1999, at B3 (reporting that Dan Somers,   28
 
(3) Potential  Competition 
Platform monopolists will evaluate actions in complementary markets through two lenses.  
On the one hand, ICE reminds us that the platform franchise often is worth more when the 
complement is efficiently supplied.  On the other hand, competition in the complement can 
sometimes threaten the durability of the primary monopoly.
96   
First, if there are no independent applications suppliers, any potential platform rival would 
need to enter at both the platform and applications levels.
97  This “two-level entry” theory is familiar 
to both telecommunications regulation and antitrust policy.  For example, the program access 
provisions of the Cable Policy Act of 1992 give satellite firms access to cable networks affiliated with 
rival cable operators in order to ensure that satellite providers can compete effectively with cable and 
are not hindered by a lack of programming availability.
98  Even if controlling a two-level monopoly 
may not yield more than one monopoly profit, it can protect that monopoly against entry.
99   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
CEO of AT&T Broadband, dismissed suggestions that it would allow video streaming of programming on the 
ground that “AT&T did not spend $56 billion to get the blood sucked out of its veins.”). 
96 Some have argued that this reason adds a dynamic element to the analysis that the traditional Chicago School 
model lacks.  See Kaplow, supra note __, at 528-30 (contrasting “dynamic” and “static” approaches); id. at 523-
23 (arguing that a monopolist’s “motivation is to change the structural conditions it faces in order that it may 
receive greater profits in the future”); Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly:  Economic 
Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 625-26 (1999) (discussing “preserving 
monopoly theory” that posits that vertical integration can be used “to impede the efforts of firms that might 
reduce the monopolist's power and thereby cause it to reduce its prices, increase innovation or perhaps lose out 
to a superior rival.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 261 (1985) 
(criticizing Chicago School orthodoxy as focused on “static” analysis and unable to take account of “strategic 
behavior”).  For an economic model of this strategy, see Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic 
Use of Tying To Preserve and Create Market Power In Evolving Industries, NBER Working Paper #6831 
(December 1998) (www.nber.org/papers/w6831). 
97 Artificially created entry barrier concerns emerged as an early “post-Chicago School” concern.  See, e.g., 
Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments In Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 645, 651-52 (1989).  
98 See 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(5); In re Implementation of Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd. 19,074 (2001) (evaluating whether to extend rules); 
News Release, FCC Extends Program Access Exclusivity Rules (June 13, 2002) (available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-223381A1.doc).   
99 In his Town of Concord opinion, then-Chief Judge Breyer set out this justification: 
 
Insofar as it is more difficult for a firm to enter an industry at two levels than at one, the monopolist, 
by expanding its monopoly power, has made entry by new firms more difficult.  And insofar as the   29
The Department of Justice relied on this very theory in the competitive impact statement it 
filed along with a consent decree that resolved its challenge to General Electric’s licensing policies 
for medical imaging equipment.  GE had imposed contractual restrictions on the ability of hospitals to 
service equipment of other hospitals.  The Department argued that these restrictions illegally raised 
the barriers to entry in the market for medical imaging equipment, because if hospitals’ service staffs 
learned to service outside equipment, new medical imaging equipment providers would need only to 
enter only the equipment market, relying on hospital service staffs to service their own equipment as 
well as that of other hospitals.
100  Thus, this case fits our framework with equipment playing the role 
of the “platform” and service the role of “applications.” 
A closely related possibility is that complements may ultimately make possible substitutes for 
the platform.  In the Microsoft case, for example, Netscape’s Web browser was a complementary 
application in the short run, but could have facilitated operating systems competition over the long 
term.
101  In exposing its own application programming interfaces, the browser represented an 
independently supplied “middleware” product that could ultimately “commoditize” the underlying 
operating system.
102  As the district court found (and the court of appeals affirmed), Microsoft 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
monopolist previously set prices cautiously to avoid attracting a competitive challenge, the added 
security of a two-level monopoly could even lead that monopolist to raise its prices. 
 
915 F.2d at 23-24; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986) 
("[W]ithout barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an 
extended time."); POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, at 202 (“The possibility that tying might discourage 
entry into the monopolized market for the tying product cannot be excluded altogether.”).  For an argument 
along these lines, see Jay Pil Choi, Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation, and the “Leverage Theory,” 111 Q. J. 
OF ECON. 1153 (1996). 
100 See United States v. General Electric, Civil No. CV 96-121-M-CCL, Competitive Impact Statement (July 13, 
1998) (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1800/1842.htm). 
101 Lessig has called this scenario a “partial substitute,” see note __, infra, but this term does not emphasize the 
temporal nature of what is often called “middleware.”  See James B. Speta, Tying, Essential Facilities, and 
Network Externalities: A Comment On Piraino, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1282 (1999) (pointing out that 
Microsoft’s predatory actions vis-a-vis Netscape can be explained on the ground that Microsoft viewed the 
browser as a partial substitute for the operating system); Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying In U.S. v. 
Microsoft:  What We Know, and Don’t Know, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 63 (2001) (same). 
102 For a discussion of the threat posed by Netscape that develops this point with reference to Microsoft’s own 
internal documents (as revealed by the trial), see Timothy F. Bresnahan, Network Effects and Microsoft 23-24 
(2001) (http://www.stanford.edu/~tbres/Microsoft/Network_Theory_and_Microsoft.pdf); see also Timothy F. 
Bresnahan, A Remedy That Falls Short of Restoring Competition, ANTITRUST 67 (Fall 2001) (“[T]he   30
concluded that this was a serious threat to its core monopoly and undertook a campaign to exclude 
that technology from the market.
103   
Second, providers of complementary applications may be among the most likely entrants into 
a platform market.  Carl Shapiro recently concluded that while “network monopolies can be very 
strong, they are most vulnerable to attack by firms in a strong position in a widely-used 
complementary product.”
104  Complementors enjoy expertise in the relevant market and also have an 
economic interest in lowering the price of the underlying platform because lower platform prices will 
drive additional demand for their product.  For the same reason, complementors need not fear a 
platform monopoly’s price cuts or quality enhancements in response to entry in the same degree as a 
stand-alone company would.
105   
Complementors were recognized as effective potential entrants in the history of the FCC’s 
financial interest and syndication (“finsyn”) rules.  In the broadcasting industry, these rules 
effectively barred major networks (then ABC, NBC, and CBS) from the programming market and 
major studios (then Fox, Warner Bros., and Paramount) from the network market.
 106  In litigation, the 
FCC failed to offer a compelling explanation for them and they were invalidated as a result.
107  In the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
development of a spectacularly innovative complementary product . . . can lower entry barriers into the 
monopolized market and create an opening for substitutes to make inroads and competition to emerge.”).   
103 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30, 38 (D.D.C 2000) (“In this case, Microsoft early on 
recognized middleware as the Trojan horse that, once having, in effect, infiltrated the applications barrier, could 
enable rival operating systems to enter the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems unimpeded. 
Simply put, middleware threatened to demolish Microsoft's coveted monopoly power.”), aff’d, 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Timothy F. Bresnahan, A Remedy That Falls Short of Restoring Competition, ANTITRUST 67, 
67-68 (Fall 2001) (describing Microsoft’s campaign). 
104 See Declaration of Carl Shapiro, United States v. Microsoft Corp. 5-6 (April 28, 2000) (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4600/4642.pdf) (listing cases).  To address Microsoft’s anticompetitive tactics 
to defeat a complementary product that threatened its monopoly platform, Shapiro’s testimony for the Justice 
Department recommended divesting Microsoft’s applications products from its operating system in order to 
create additional competition in the operating systems market.  See id.; but see Howard A. Shelanski & J. 
Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 99 (2001) (criticizing 
proposal). 
105 See Joseph Farrell, Prospects for Deregulation In Telecommunications, 4 INDUSTRIAL AND CORPORATE 
CHANGE __, __ (1997) 
106 See Schurz Comm, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045-48 (7th Cir. 1992). 
107 Judge Posner summed up his evaluation of the FCC’s justification for these rules:  “Stripped of verbiage, the 
opinion, like a Persian cat with its fur shaved, is alarmingly pale and thin.”  Id. at 1050.  Most commentators 
have concurred with Judge Posner’s critical assessment of the rules.  See, e.g., Crandall, supra note __, at 178-
79.   31
wake of their removal, the studios – who had been the complementary providers of programming -- 
quickly entered the platform market, creating three new networks.  Likewise, the existing networks 
moved quickly into the creation of their own programming.
108  Similarly, in the telecommunications 
industry, the long distance providers – who rely on the local network -- are seen both by the Telecom 
Act and the FCC as likely entrants into the local telephone market. 
 
(4)   Bargaining Problems 
When there is a gatekeeper in the form of a platform monopolist, the parties will sometimes 
fail to reach a mutually beneficial access arrangement.  These “bargaining problems” often involve 
one of two situations.  In the first situation, a complementor develops an innovative application, but 
“transaction costs” obstruct agreement with the platform gatekeeper and the innovation lies fallow.
109  
In a fully modular structure without a gatekeeper, the innovation could quickly be introduced.
110  
Thus, this problem has an immediate impact.
111 
In the second kind of bargaining problem, the platform provider threatens to withhold access 
to the platform unless the application inventor licenses its new application for one dollar.  If the 
inventor reluctantly agrees, this may be an efficient solution after the fact, but the prospect of this 
outcome discourages efficient independent invention.
112  Naturally, the problem described in the 
previous paragraph similarly discourages independent invention (in addition to its immediate impact).  
                                                           
108 In so doing, the networks often eschewed outside programming, only much later realizing the benefits of 
contracting out.  See, e.g., Bill Carter, Ailing ABC Turns To HBO In Search of TV Hits, N.Y. TIMES D1 (August 
5, 2002) (reporting that, after its initial hesitation, ABC decided not to rely largely on its internal production of 
programming, but to solicit programming from outside sources).   This history underscores how the finsyn rules 
were important in protecting modularity and preventing vertical integration, whether or not it was desirable. 
109 See Michael L. Katz, Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy:  Four Principles For A Complex 
World, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. __, __ (2002). 
110 This is the case in the Internet environment, for example, where the openness of the logical standard allows 
developers of applications like Napster to introduce them without first obtaining permission of the network 
owner.  See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
111 Economists would call this “short-run” both because it is immediate and because it is an inefficiency given 
the set of applications that have been developed, in contrast to the next problem sketched in the text. 
112 Invoking this theory, the FTC complained that Intel’s demand of intellectual property licenses on favorable 
terms from its licensees (complementors) ran afoul of the antitrust laws.  See note __, supra; Carl Shapiro, The   32
To the extent that the “transaction costs” and “holdout” problems discourage innovation that would 
otherwise be efficient and desirable, this might be called a longer-term problem inherent in closed 
architectures.
113  In a fully modular and open architecture environment, by contrast, a superior 
application can capture quasi-rents broadly commensurate with its incremental value.   
In the still longer term, ICE might address these problems:  if the platform sponsor thinks that 
more complementary innovation will be forthcoming as a result, it could set up a private commons or 
otherwise implement modularity.  In exposing its APIs to independent developers, Microsoft has 
roughly done this.  That is, for the most part (and “for the most part” is of course important), 
Microsoft cooperates, and indeed spends money and resources to cooperate, with complementary 
software (applications) providers.
114  Similarly, Intel carefully manages its complementors and, like 
Microsoft, its policies have attracted antitrust oversight.
115   
But these and similarly situated firms sometimes find it hard to make a credible commitment 
to such modularity.  One way to make such a commitment credible may be for the platform 
monopolist to stay out of the complementary sector altogether.  Just as in the AT&T case where the 
Justice Department was skeptical that equal access was possible without divestiture and quarantine, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
FTC’s Challenge To Intel’s Cross-Licensing Policies (June 2002), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/intel.pdf. 
113 To mitigate these potential barriers to innovation, intellectual property law has sought to develop certain 
open access doctrines.  On whether copyright law should allow complementors to gain access to a platform 
standard through reverse engineering as a means of addressing transaction cost issues, see Lichtman, supra note 
__, at __-__ (discussing issue and arguing against such access).  On whether patent law should give second-
generation inventors legal protection to facilitate a fair arrangement with the original inventor and address the 
holdout problem, see Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:  Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991) (discussing issue and arguing for such protection).  Moreover, real 
property law also recognizes that “strategic behavior” can prevent a socially desirable arrangement and provides 
for flexibility in crafting appropriate relief so as to avoid this outcome.  See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek 
Property Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276-79 (7
th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). 
114 See MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO & RICHARD W. SELBY, MICROSOFT SECRETS: HOW THE WORLD'S MOST 
POWERFUL SOFTWARE COMPANY CREATES TECHNOLOGY, SHAPES MARKETS, AND MANAGES PEOPLE (1995).  
Under the proposed consent decree reached with the Justice Department, Microsoft would formalize – and be 
subject to judicial oversight related to – the disclosure of information related to its otherwise proprietary 
interfaces.  See Joe Wilcox, Microsoft Tallies Anitrust Efforts, CNET News.com (August 5, 2002) 
(http://news.com.com/2100-1009-948440.html). 
115 For a discussion of Intel’s strategy, see Gawer, supra note __.  For Intel’s antitrust issues, see Intel Corp., 
Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid, Public Comment at 2 (Mar. 17, 1999), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelanalysis.htm; see also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 
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some platform gatekeepers think their complementors will find a voluntary quarantine the best 
guarantee of fair treatment.  But for firms without government oversight of their policies, spinning off 
certain divisions – as AT&T did with Lucent to enable it to sell to its competitors – may be a 
promising strategy. 
 
(5)   Incompetent Incumbents 
As a prediction of business strategies, ICE can and will fail if the platform monopolist fails to 
understand ICE itself.  This phenomenon of “incumbents not getting ICE” could be a significant 
crack in ICE’s logic as predictor of the platform monopolist’s actual decisions.  Some applications of 
ICE are surprising even for professional economists.
116  Moreover, even where top management 
appreciates ICE, other employees may be reluctant to let a rival take business away from a division of 
the firm.  Thus, even if there is only one monopoly profit, some may think otherwise and inefficiently 
seek a second.
117  Or, for either rational or irrational (e.g., psychological) reasons, firms may resist 
helping rivals in the applications market, even if some of that success will also benefit the platform 
monopolist.
118 
In our experience, businesspersons often find it counterintuitive to help outside firms compete 
against internal supply in applications.
119  This may be particularly likely if the benefit of modularity 
comes in the form of “a hundred flowers” of diverse paths of innovation in the complement.
120  In 
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particular, incumbents may lack the imagination to realize what they are failing to imagine, and thus 
fail to implement modularity even when it will spur greater innovation and thus increase their 
platform profits. 
Appreciating ICE’s insights for business strategy may be particularly difficult for industries 
emerging from a regulated environment of end-to-end service, which will often view voluntarily 
implemented modularity as a foreign concept or as an anathama.
121   ICE-aware business 
commentators have argued that the customer relationship business, the product innovation business, 
and the infrastructure business can be “unbundled” from one another to great efficiency benefits,
122 
but that regulated incumbent firms often fail to recognize this opportunity.
123  Thus two commentators 
claim that the local telephone companies have “deliberately limited the growth and profitability of 
their infrastructure business to protect their customer relationship business.”
124   
Such ICE-savvy commentators also often argue that Apple missed the boat in the early 1980s 
by not licensing its operating system so that others could build computer systems around it.
125  Apple 
had developed an operating system widely viewed as better than Microsoft’s MS-DOS (which IBM 
and others licensed),
126 but it thought it could make more money if it bundled the operating system 
with its own computers.  Thus, considered as an operating system platform provider, Apple bet on its 
own production and distribution channel rather than on a competitive hardware sector.  Whether it 
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failed to “get it” (i.e., did not see that it was making this bet), or was simply wrong about its hardware 
and distribution prowess, Apple thus lost the chance to be the leading producer of operating systems, 
realizing too late that it would have done better to promote an open network.
127   
If, as we suggest, incumbents do not always fully understand ICE, what policy implications 
might follow?  Sensibly, public policy does not normally let regulators tell a business how to 
maximize its profits.
128  Rather, the antitrust laws and regulatory policy generally take the position 
that they do not serve to correct business strategy failures. 
Although we agree with this reluctance to second-guess individual platform providers’ 
calculations of their best interests, one lesson does follow.  The less we can count on monopoly to be 
efficient even on its own terms, the more we should value platform-level (intermodal) competition, 
perhaps especially diverse competition.
129  In the case of Apple, for example, the presence of a rival 
platform ensured that customers were protected by the availability of an alternative platform, while 
Apple was more strikingly and visibly punished for its error.  Even monopolists who disregard ICE 
are punished in the form of lower profit margins, the punishment is sharper or at least more visible 
when there is competition among platforms.
130  Thus, the arcane complexities of ICE and its 
implications boost the (already strong) case for platform-level competition.
131 
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If, as Judge Posner claims, the economics-based Chicago approach has won in antitrust,
132 we 
urge that this salutary triumph be leavened by recognizing that competition protects not only against 
powerful firms with bad incentives (on which economics-based antitrust mainly focuses), but also 
against powerful firms with incompetent or dishonest management.  When a firm fails to optimize 
modularity in a competitive industry, its shareholders suffer, but customers broadly do not.  When a 
monopoly fails to do, however, customers suffer.  Antitrust and regulation should thus aim to protect 
against incompetent monopolies as well as against rapacious ones. 
 
  (6)   Option Value 
Paradoxically (even perversely), fear of access regulation may itself discourage a firm from 
opening its platform.  After a monopolist allows open access to its platform, it may not later be 
allowed to pursue a closed or fully integrated strategy.  Under current antitrust practice, for example, 
a firm is far more likely to get into trouble for closing a previously open platform than for never 
opening it in the first place.
133  Some commentators and judges have noted the adverse ex ante effect 
of imposing liability for changing a cooperative practice and have cautioned courts against imposing 
such liability,
134 but the fear of such liability will not dissipate any time soon.  Consequently, a firm 
may keep its platform closed even if it would more profitably be open, if the “option value” of later 
being able to close it is important. 
Thus suppose that the platform provider can extract $10 per customer of profits in 
applications by monopolizing that market, and knows the demand for its platform that will result, but 
is uncertain about how much more valuable the platform would be to its customers if applications 
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were competitively supplied.  Suppose in particular that the firm thinks it equally likely that 
customers will value the platform at only $5 more (the advantages of applications competition are 
small) or that customers will value the platform at $12 more (competitively supplied applications are 
very valuable).  Then the efficient path, which also (as in ICE) maximizes the firm’s overall profits, is 
to open the platform initially, learn how much customer value that openness, and to leave it open if 
customers turn out to value competition in applications at $12, but to close it and to take over the 
applications market if they turn out to value competition in applications at only $5.   
But if that path will be prohibited (or will expose the firm to antitrust liability), the firm must 
choose between opening the market forever and closing it.  Because an equal chance of a $5 or $12 
boost to platform demand (from applications competition) is worth less than the $10 applications 
profits, a firm faced with that constrained choice will prefer to close the platform.  Removal of the 
option to close the platform (if customer value from openness is disappointing) tips the balance in this 
example and causes the firm to close the platform ab initio. 
 
(7)  Regulatory Strategy Considerations 
A second “iatrogenic”
135 exception to ICE arises if a firm thinks allowing open access in one 
context will increase its regulatory duties elsewhere.  On this logic, a broadband transport provider 
might refuse to open its platform on the theory that even if a certain form of open access increases its 
profits, it does not want to risk being required to provide other access or allow a precedent that it cede 
any control of its network.  To refer to the example given above with regard to option value, we might 
imagine that in one context – say, open access to broadband transport – competitive providers of 
broadband Internet service might actually add value to the firm’s broadband transport product, but in 
another, related market – say, in the supply of video content – competitive providers will actually 
detract value from the cable company’s core product offering.  If the cable firm believed that an 
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endorsement of a regulatory duty – or even a voluntary action – in the first context would make it 
substantially more likely that it would face a regulatory duty in the second context, it might rationally 
resist open access in that first context even though it would be profitable there.  Similarly, AT&T may 
have believed that the complementary product at issue in the Hush-A-Phone case was benign, but 
resisted allowing its use for fear that the precedent would apply to other markets that would impact its 
profits.  In this way, the likely response of law and regulation can affect a firm’s stance toward 
modularity.  
The weight placed on such regulatory strategy considerations may well differ from firm to 
firm, as some firms may be more inclined than others to believe that regulators will make broad 
generalizations across markets.  Certainly, regulators do sometimes make such generalizations across 
firms, as they use benchmarking between different regional monopolists in devising public policy.
136  
Thus, in the cable market, they may well seek to preserve – or at least bemoan the loss of – those 
cable firms with a different set of assets or business strategy – say, AOL/Time Warner – on the view 
that some cable firms will be more willing than others to experiment with open access arrangements. 
 
(8) Incomplete  Complementarity 
In some markets, where applications can be valuable without the platform, there is an 
opportunity for platform providers to profit by monopolizing the applications market.  As Michael 
Whinston has explained, this exception arises where (1) the monopolized product is not essential for 
all uses of the complementary good; and (2) there are economies of scale or network effects in the 
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complementary market.
137  In such cases, say, a restaurant on a beach resort that some travelers attend 
for day trips, but others stay for longer periods, the monopolist – in this case, the resort – might be 
able to reap greater profits by bundling its complementary product (meals) with its core offering 
(resort stay) in order to foreclose the complementary market to rivals.  Because the information 
industries tend to enjoy fairly strong complementarities between platform markets and applications, 
we have assumed that applications are provided strictly along with the platform.  In certain cases, 
however, an application for one platform – say, broadband transport – may also be useful for another 
one – say, narrowband transport – possibly leading the broadband transport provider to attempt to 
control the applications market. 
 
IV.  Lessons From ICE, Its Exceptions, and The Computer Inquiries 
As discussed in Part II, modern antitrust generally supposes that ICE is broadly right with 
limited and fairly easily diagnosed exceptions.  Consequently, antitrust law usually permits even a 
dominant firm to make its own vertical choices.  In contrast, as telecommunications policy moved 
away from its disposition toward regulated integration, it turned sharply toward mandating modularity 
or “openness” with the Hush-a-Phone and Carterfone decisions, followed by the breakup of the Bell 
System and the Telecommunications Act’s unbundling provisions.   
For a true convergence of antitrust and regulatory policy, policymakers and commentators 
will need to develop a common perspective on how to use ICE.  In an era where the monopoly 
platform was generally price-regulated, the telecom presumption to mandate modularity might be 
justified by this fact alone:  “Baxter’s law” notes that ICE does not apply to regulated monopolies.
138  
And while the Telecom Act’s unbundling obligations aim to play several roles, they can in part be 
understood in this light, as shifting the focus from regulating a monopoly at the retail level to 
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regulating “bottleneck” wholesale inputs – say, the local lines to residential telephone subscribers.
139  
But increasingly, as in the provision of broadband transport via cable modems, telecommunications 
regulators will contemplate access regulation where the platform is not generally price-regulated.  To 
make such judgments in a fashion that is consistent with antitrust policy, policymakers must 
appreciate both the different regulatory tools for facilitating modularity and the possible regulatory 
philosophies for addressing the issue.  This Part addresses each issue in turn. 
   
A.  Regulatory Strategies To Facilitate Modularity 
Regulatory models to preserve the benefits of modularity fall into two categories:  “structural 
measures” and “conduct remedies.”
140  After briefly describing each category, this Section concludes 
by describing how the FCC, in its Computer Inquiries, vacillated among different approaches.  
  The classic and pure form of structural regulation is a “quarantine” that forbids the platform 
monopolist from participating in the applications sector.  A quarantine is more drastic than even an 
antitrust divestiture used to remedy an unlawful merger because the regulator must continue to 
enforce line-of-business restrictions.  In principle, this form of regulation strives for clarity in its 
definition and administerability, but, as demonstrated by the AT&T consent decree requirement that 
the Bell Companies be quarantined in the local telephone market,
141 it can be difficult to police such 
restrictions in practice.  Finally, this form of regulation precludes (by definition) potential integrative 
efficiencies.
142 
  Recognizing these problems, regulators will often seek to enable at least some integrative 
efficiencies while still largely preventing anticompetitive behavior.  If, for example, a less stringent 
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solution than the quarantine could limit to x the amount of anticompetitive harms while facilitating x 
+ 10 integrative efficiencies, regulators would be wise to adopt that strategy.   
 In an attempt to strike an optimal balance of costs and benefits from regulation, regulators 
sometimes replace a quarantine with a structural separation requirement that allows the platform 
provider to integrate but tries to ensure that it not abuse its position.  Under the Telecom Act, for 
example, the Bell Companies may enter the long-distance market once certain conditions are met, but 
must do so through a structurally separate entity.
143  This form of regulation aims to modulate 
incentives and set up a monitoring regime so as to make the platform monopolist behave in some 
ways (the worrying ways) as if it were not integrated into the applications market, even while 
behaving in other ways (the integrative efficiencies) as if it is.   
Implementing a structural separation solution is inherently challenging and is apt to require a 
good deal of regulatory effort to ensure that the regulated firm in fact provides equal access to its 
platform.  This effort may well include policing the equal access arrangements and overseeing the 
management of the separate subsidiary (including the imputation of any access charges); and, in many 
cases, the stricter the rules to achieve this, the greater the collateral damage to integrative efficiencies 
that presumably motivated the rejection of a quarantine approach.  It is very difficult to know in 
advance – let alone measure – whether a particular regulatory reform will allow more by way of 
efficiencies or of anticompetitive effect.  Nonetheless, regulators often seek to develop less restrictive 
strategies than quarantine without moving all the way to vertical laissez-faire. 
Another alternative is a pure “conduct remedy” that directs the platform provider not to 
discriminate.  This requires the regulator (or court) to supervise the firm’s actions on an ongoing 
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basis,
144 but does not restrict its entry into applications markets.  Conduct remedies can include 
various forms of facilitating “open access,” including (1) interconnection; and (2) unbundling.
145   
Interconnection mandates require a platform provider to allow other platform providers to 
make their products compatible.  (A precondition of such a mandate is, of course, that there is some 
platform-level competition.)  Specifically, regulators can either require compatibility or establish a 
right for a firm (presumably a non-dominant one) to request it.  Two different kinds of compatibility 
requirements might apply in different situations:  requirements that govern access to applications on 
rival platforms, and requirements that govern access to customers who use rival platforms.  For an 
example of the latter, consider the FCC’s mandate (as part of a merger approval) that AOL develop 
an interoperable system with at least two other instant messaging providers.
146  For such situations, 
interconnection requirements ensure that platform rivals share the benefits of a larger network, even if 
one firm contributes the majority of customers on that network.
147   
In telecommunications, where competitors must often cooperate to deliver a compatible (or 
indeed any) product, regulators often must evaluate requests for and supervise the terms of 
interconnection.
148  In most cases, interconnection arrangements will impose costs – e.g., for 
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terminating a call arising from a competitors’ network.
149  Sound regulatory policy would mandate 
interconnection – and wade into the supervision of interconnection terms and conditions – in cases 
where so doing will facilitate efficient competition.  In particular, appropriate interconnection policies 
and the continued presence of alternative networks can create opportunities for experimentation 
between alternative business strategies, including the stance towards vertical relations. 
By contrast to an interconnection requirement, an unbundling mandate requires a firm to 
allow others to complement one of its products; this often calls for detailed supervision and requires 
the firm to reduce the scope of its product or service to something smaller than it would otherwise 
choose to supply.
150  For example, as a condition of their merger, the FTC mandated that AOL/Time 
Warner offer transport separately and not only together with Internet access.
151  Similarly, in the 
Carterfone decision, the FCC required AT&T to unbundle equipment from telephone service, 
triggering a set of proceedings to define the interface between the local telephone network and 
customer premises equipment.  Thus, unbundling regulation governs situations when an applications 
developer – a complementor to the platform provider -- seeks “vertical compatibility” or access to a 
platform in order to deploy a complement (e.g. an applications program) that works with the system.  
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In so doing, unbundling regulation must decide on the scope of modularity to be imposed by 
regulation. 
  
B.  The Computer Inquiries 
The history of the FCC’s Computer Inquiries illustrates the challenges of access regulation 
that governed the relationship between a platform and its application market.  In the 1960s, when data 
processing services (applications) began to be offered over the network (platform) of a monopoly 
telephone company, the FCC found itself presented with just the problems on which this Article 
focuses:  local telephone companies, each the sole supplier in its region of the basic platform for such 
services, wished to integrate and to provide such services in competition with others. 
In its Computer I decision, the Commission found that computer data services enjoyed “open 
competition and relatively free entry,” and concluded that it should not “at this point, assert regulatory 
authority over data processing as such.”
152  As a result of an earlier antitrust consent decree that 
limited AT&T to providing regulated common carrier services,
153 this decision not to regulate data 
processing amounted to a quarantine, excluding the platform monopolist AT&T from the 
“application” sector (data processing).
154   The FCC recognized that AT&T and other local telephone 
companies would be obvious entrants into this market, but emphasized its concern that they would 
“favor their own data processing activities by discriminatory services, cross-subsidization, improper 
pricing of common carrier services, and related anticompetitive practices and activities.”
155  Its initial 
response was thus to impose a quarantine on AT&T while allowing non-Bell telephone companies to 
integrate into data processing through a structurally separated subsidiary. 
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But the Computer I regime’s quarantine turned out to be hard to implement, because it 
required the FCC to classify all services.  Because it could not anticipate how to divide all services 
into “telecommunications” and “data processing,” the FCC decided to classify “hybrid services” on a 
case-by-case basis.
156  In so doing, however, the FCC created a large amount of work for itself in the 
form of a continuous stream of cases that ultimately led it to reconsider altogether the basic premises 
of the Computer I regime.
 157 
 In its Computer II decision, the Commission followed the same basic philosophy as in 
Computer I, but developed a new dividing line between “basic” telecommunications services and 
“enhanced” services.  In so doing, it concluded that would not regulate the latter even if they relied on 
and contained basic telecommunications services.
158  Moreover, the Computer II rules tinkered with 
its philosophy by lifting the separate subsidiary requirement for non-Bell (“independent”) local 
telephone (monopoly) companies, and concluding that the Bell Companies, if allowed to provide such 
services, could do so under a separate subsidiary.
159  In the place of structural regulation for the 
independent telephone companies, the Commission imposed a set of open access requirements on the 
telephone companies to ensure the unimpeded growth of enhanced services.
160  
In a subsequent re-evaluation, the FCC’s Computer III decision ended the requirement that 
the Bell Companies establish a separate subsidiary to provide enhanced services (although the Bell 
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Companies were still restricted under the MFJ), concluding that this form of regulation ultimately 
imposed more costs than it yielded consumer benefits, particularly when replaced with a set of non-
structural safeguards.
161  With respect to such safeguards, the decision called for “comparably 
efficient interconnection” and “open network architecture” requirements to ensure enhanced service 
providers non-discriminatory access to the telephone network.
162  In the wake of a remand from the 
Ninth Circuit regarding these requirements, the Commission has yet to close the book on the 
Computer III rules.
163   
In short, the FCC’s actions in the Computer Inquiries reflect a series of different approaches 
to regulating the relationship between the data processing and telecommunications market, beginning 
with a quarantine-like model in Computer I, moving to structural separation in Computer II, and then 
to a conduct remedy without structural separation in Computer III.  Similarly, while the MFJ 
quarantined the Bell Companies from certain adjacent markets, first the MFJ court and then the 
Telecom Act loosened the restrictions, allowing for more vertical integration.
164  Likewise, in the 
private sphere, firms often voluntarily change their approaches to vertical scope, as AT&T did with 
its divestiture of its equipment-manufacturing arm Lucent, and with its wireless and cable operations. 
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An optimistic interpretation of such instability would be that, unsurprisingly in view of the 
competing merits, the right policy can shift quickly, and that policymakers and executives ably track 
these shifts.  For instance, relevant magnitudes may simply vary over time.  Or perhaps a spell of 
quarantine will establish reliable access arrangements, creating a benchmark that makes later 
discrimination harder and thus making it possible to capture benefits of vertical integration without 
excessive discrimination or the need for heavy-handed conduct regulation.
165  Alternatively, a cynical 
interpretation would be that the FCC rightly adopted a quarantine in Computer I and that later 
relaxations reflect the political power of the local telephone companies.  Finally, a pessimistic but less 
cynical interpretation would be that the FCC was repeatedly stabbing in the dark, unable to form a 
stable view of the relative merits of different policies. 
We see little evidence of subtle balancing to suggest that changes in the relevant 
circumstances explain the changes in policy, so it is tempting instead to describe the variation as 
“vacillating” in an inadequate analytical framework.
166  Thus, having first adopted one imperfect 
policy, regulators may become painfully aware of its deficiencies and of the advantages of an 
alternative approach.  This greener-grass syndrome could arise with any tradeoff, but it seems 
particularly likely with a tradeoff only poorly understood and not guided by clearly developed 
analytical principles.  Indeed, in recent years, the FCC’s inability to articulate its outlook on vertical 
relations clearly and convincingly – in the finsyn case and the Computer III rules, for example – has 
begun to plague it in court, where it must offer a cogent explanation for policy swings.  In light of the 
judicial oversight of its decisions and the industry’s call for regulatory clarity, there is considerable 
pressure on the FCC to develop a clear position.  As discussed at the outset of the Article, the FCC’s 
recently commenced proceedings on broadband may offer it such an opportunity. 
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In its recently commenced broadband proceedings, the FCC announced that it intends to re-
examine its Computer III rules.  In the old environment, regulated monopoly telephone companies 
held the keys to the development of new, “information services” like “dial-a-joke” and dial-up 
Internet access.
167  Without the cooperation of the local monopoly telephone provider, these services 
might not have been developed or deployed in an effective manner.  During the 1970s, the FCC’s 
Carterfone decision’s requirement of “network neutrality” (i.e., that any compliant equipment be 
allowed to use the telephone network) and the open access rules developed in Computer II (and later 
Computer III) converged to facilitate competition in – and ultimately justify the deregulation of -- 
equipment manufacturing.
168  As Baxter’s Law indicates, local monopoly providers often have an 
incentive to evade regulation by reaping profits in unregulated (or less tightly regulated) markets.  
The FCC responded successfully in this case by facilitating competition in and ultimately 
deregulating the equipment manufacturing market.  Indeed, the FCC recently even lifted the 
requirement that local telephone service be unbundled from equipment sales, only leaving in place its 
requirements related to network neutrality.
169  
  In its broadband proceedings, the FCC has an opportunity to re-think the traditional 
differences between the roles of antitrust and of regulation.  In updating its Computer Inquiry rules 
for the broadband context, where price regulation is not an issue, the FCC will need to explain to 
what extent the Computer Inquiry rules reflected Baxter’s law, a regulatory commitment to protecting 
modularity based on another exception (or exceptions) to ICE, or some other reason.  In re-thinking 
the basis for these rules, the FCC will be able to decide whether to adopt a more “antitrust-like” 
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approach to regulation.  In particular, antitrust law aspires to aid the workings of the market by ruling 
on the legality of certain potentially anticompetitive practices, whereas regulation substitutes for the 
market itself.  In the traditional public utility regulation environment, regulators oversaw price-setting 
as well as entry and exit decisions in order to limit the monopolists’ ability to extract rents from 
consumers while ensuring that the regulated utility earned a sufficient return on its investment.
170  As 
alternative providers entered formerly monopolized industries, antitrust enforcers sought to facilitate 
competition, whereas regulators reacted hesitantly.
171  Ultimately, in the Telecom Act, regulatory 
policy endorsed entry and aimed to facilitate competition in an emergingly competitive market,
172 but 
the Act still left the FCC with broad regulatory powers and discretion in picking regulatory strategies. 
  In developing its regulatory strategy for new environments such as broadband where price 
regulation is not generally an issue, the FCC can begin to define more clearly when to impose 
restrictions on a firm’s conduct – for instance, only after exclusionary conduct is demonstrated, where 
it seems probable, or where it would do the most harm.  In the antitrust context, enforcers only 
address exclusionary conduct by a monopoly once demonstrated to a court, but are authorized to act 
in advance of such conduct where it is a probable result of a merger.  In the regulatory context, 
regulators often adopt proactive regulations to avoid vertical competitive harms before they occur, but 
they have rarely explained how their actions fit with the ICE logic or antitrust policy more 
generally.
173 
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CONCLUSION 
The future course of regulation on vertical relations can take one of three basic coherent 
paths.  Each of these models for regulation ultimately converges with antitrust policy by taking 
account of integrative efficiencies, appreciating the logic of ICE, and acknowledging its exceptions, 
but each proceeds from different basic premises.  In particular, they differ in their presumptions about 
the reliability of assessing claimed exceptions to ICE, in their presumptions about vertical 
efficiencies, and in the ability of the FCC to administer different regulatory regimes. 
In the model closest to antitrust practice, the FCC could refrain from aggressive regulatory 
policies unless a careful investigation compellingly shows that ICE fails and that the likely benefits of 
regulation outweigh its costs.
174  This model thus expects that exceptions to ICE can be reliably 
diagnosed or predicted (and efficiently corrected by regulation).  In the first instance, this model 
would most likely not authorize more ambitious regulatory policies.  But over time, this model would 
evaluate (on a case-by-case basis) arguments for more restrictive regulatory policies, investigating 
claims that ICE substantially fails along the lines envisioned by an analytically coherent exception.  
Similarly, this model could also consider how existing regulations can be removed due to a change in 
marketplace circumstances (or new economic learning).
175 
The two other possible models, while very different in substance, are both based on 
pessimism about the ability of regulators to diagnose exceptions to ICE.  Since some of the 
exceptions sketched above might easily be colorably asserted in a wide range of cases, it is not 
unreasonable to be pessimistic about such diagnosis.  One response to such pessimism could be a 
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categorical protection of modularity, as in much recent telecommunications policy and as advocated 
by Lessig and others for broadband.
176  An alternative response to this pessimism is a categorical 
presumption that ICE always applies, as in a hard-line Chicago approach.
177  Stating the strategies in 
this manner suggests a helpful way to frame the contrast between an open architecture strategy and 
the Chicago School approach.   Some Chicago scholars appear to trust ICE more than they trust 
imperfect regulators or courts to diagnose its exceptions; while open architecture advocates such as 
Lessig appear to trust the history of successful innovation through modularity (and its extrapolation to 
the future) more than they trust either ICE or regulators’ ability to diagnose its exceptions. 
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